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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: The national evaluation of the Youth
Firearms Violence Initiative (YFVI),
a program initiated by the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to combat the rise of
juvenile firearms violence. COPS
provided up to $1 million to 10
participating cities to fund interventions that employed community
policing approaches to decrease the
number of violent firearms crimes
committed by youths, including
gang- and drug·related offenses.
Key issues: From 1985 to 1994,
the rate of violent criminal acts
committed by juveniles rose sharply
at a time when violence committed
by adults was declining. During that
time period, while the adult homicide rate fell by 25 percent, the homicide rate for 18- to 24-year-olds
doubled, and the rate for 15- to 17year-olds more than tripled. More
specifically, juvenile homicides committed with a handgun more than
doubled, while juvenile homicides
committed with other weapons
remained essentially unchanged.
Key findings: Among the
evaluation's findings were the
following:
• A dedicated unit may exert a
greater effect on gun-related crime
than a unit that applies traditional
tactics and uses patrol officers on a
·:ating basis.

November 2000

National Evaluation of the Youth
Firearms Violence Initiative
By Terence Dunworth

Between 1985 and 1994, violent criminal
acts committed by juveniles grew at an
alarming pace in the United States. This
trend diverged significantly from adult
patterns. From 1985 to 1994, for instance, the homicide rate for adults age
25 and older declined 25 percent. During
the same period, the homicide rate for
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continued...

Handguns became the weapon of choice
for juveniles. Exhibit 2 shows that during
this time period, the number of homicides
committed by juveniles with handguns

Exhibit 1. Comparison of juvenile and adult homicide rates, 1976-1997
YFVI Starts
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When employed as part of YFVI,
ditional enforcement tactics did
t produce significant changes in
!arms violence levels.

18- to 24-year-olds doubled, and the rate
of homicides committed by teenagers
ages 15 to 17 tripled. (See exhibit l.)
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Exhibit 2. Nationwide weapon use by offenders ages 18-24, 1976-1997

continued ...
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• Cooperation with other law enforcement agencies and community
organizations and representatives
was a key factor in effective implementation of firearms violence
control and prevention strategies.
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• Proactive arrest policies, focused
on gun-related offenses, were
shown to have a consistent measurable association with subsequent gun-related crime.
• Most of the participating departments returned to traditional policing approaches when Federal
funding ended. In this sense, YFVI
did not change the way departments conducted their business,
and YFVI strategies were not, in
general, institutionalized.
• Most departments found it difficult to implement the geographic
information systems called for by
the initiative. However, all five intensive sites maintained computerized files on incidents (arrests and
crimes), permitting geographic
analysis after incident addresses
were parsed.
• Not all departments implemented programs that focused on
the objectives of the YFVI. This suggests that Federal agencies will
sometimes need to play a strong
role in ensuring that grantees address and meet the strategic intent
of the initiatives they fund. The
challenge is for the Federal agency
to do this while simultaneously promoting local generation and definition of programmatic activities.

Target audience: State and local
law enforcement, probation, and
parole officials; policymakers and
planning officials; court administrators; and researchers.
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more than doubled, while the number of
juvenile homicides involving other weapons remained essentially constant.

the number of firearms-related gang offenses, and reduce the number of firearmsrelated drug offenses.

TheY outh Firearms Violence Initiative
(YFVI) was launched in 1995 by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
It provided up to $1 million to the police
departments of 10 participating cities (Baltimore, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama;
Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cleveland, Ohio;
Inglewood, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Richmond, Virginia; Salinas, California; San Antonio, Texas; and Seattle,
Washington) to fund interventions directed
at combating the rise of youth firearms via-

YFVI was conceived at a time when juvenile violence was ascending and seemed
little influenced by any previously attempted interventions. Although some
strategies seemed promising (the Boston
Gun Projectl and the St. Louis "Knock
and Talk" program, 2 for example), they
were not in general use, and the criminal
justice community expressed little confidence at that time that the solutions to the
problem had been identified. YFVI was
an attempt to rectify that deficiency.

lence. The initiative encouraged these jurisdictions to employ community policing
approaches to develop or enhance youthfocuse.-1 programs designed to decrease the
ofviolentfirearmscrimes,reduce
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COPS provided general programmatic
guidelines to the 10 departments but requested action plans that reflected local
needs. The cities proposed a mix of enforcement programs (both street level and
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school based), prevention programs,
and information systems enhancements. Exhibit 3 shows budget allocations by category for each site, as set
forth in the final plans. Overall, about
60 percent of the grant was budgeted
for law enforcement staff, and most of
this was devoted to police personnel,
through either overtime expenses or
the creation of new positions. A little
less than one-fourth of YFVI funds
was budgeted for local evaluation,
civilian consultants (e.g., for training),
and community-based organizations
and activities. Nearly 15 percentmore than $1 million collectivelywas budgeted to purchase computer
hardware and software or to develop
information systems.

describe how the sites implemented
these strategies, and to inform other
jurisdictions about the successes and
failures of these strategies. The evaluation solicitation specified that there
should be five "intensive" and five
"nonintensive" sites. In the intensive
sites, impact and intensive process
evaluations would be conducted; in the
nonintensive sites, only summary process evaluations would be conducted. 3
The impact evaluations would determine the impact of YFVI on levels of
youth firearm violence, while the process evaluations would focus on program implementation and organization.

The national evaluation

• Program development: How and
why the sites selected their strategies, their target selection process,
implementation problems encountered during the intervention, and
changes made to the program during the intervention.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
sponsored the national valuation of
YFVI (from the fall of 1 95 through
the summer of 1998) to assess the
impact of the sites' strategies for addressing youth firearms violence, to
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Specific issues that were investigated
in the process evaluations at alllO
sites included:

• Officer training: The content and
focus of YFVI-related training
implemented at the sites.
• Team selection: The process for
selecting supervisors and officers for
YFVI interventions and any problems
caused by the selection process.
• Computer systems support: The
computer systems used to support
YFVI operations and the overall
utility of these systems for such an
initiative.
• Strategies and tactics: The types
of enforcement, community policing, prevention, and other activities
undertaken with YFVI grant funds.
• Program results: What the YFVIfunded police officers and other
program elements accomplished,
such as the number of arrests made
and the number of guns seized.
• Local evaluation role: The types
of evaluation activities undertaken
and an overall assessment of the
appropriateness of the evaluation
approaches.

Exhibit 3. Budget allocations for the 10 YFVI police departments, by category of expense
Total YFVI
Funding

Law
Enforcement

Civilian Consultants
and Local Evaluation

Equipment

Community
Organizations and
Activities

$999,906

$821,897

$51,900

$23,104

$103,005

$0

Birmingham

744,896

94,000

118,750

465,286

0

66,860

Bridgeport

916,748

496,170

320,120

74,258

25,000

1.200

Cleveland

685,342

562,692

100,000

12,650

4,500

5,500

Inglewood

787,201

532,536

56,575

81,000

90,000

27,090

Milwaukee

999,990

533,343

125,844

60,000

280,803

0

Richmond

457,119

277,931

152,936

10,100

0

16,152

Salinas

999,524

623,108

73.200

246,000

45,000

12,216

San Antonio

999,963

695,195

170,000

99,740

0

35,028

Seattle

999,990

416.400

205,500

214,980

0

163,110

$8,590,679

$5,053,272

$1,374,825

$1,287,118

$548,308

$327,156

Site
Baltimore

Total

Miscellaneous
Costs*

* Miscellaneous costs include supplies, training materials, travel, and conference attendance .
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This information was obtained throu~
a review of program materials (projectrelated documents, such as the site's
proposal to COPS, quarterly progress
reports, interim and final reports, and
other internal documents); periodic telephone and onsite interviews with police
supervisors and officers participating
in the YFVI initiative; ridealongs with
YFVI officers; interviews with local
evaluators; and an analysis of summary
data provided by the police department
(YFVI enforcement schedules and activity logs, for example).
COPS, NIJ, and Abt Associates Inc.
determined which sites would be designated as intensive and nonintensive,
based on the following criteria:
• Evaluability, or the likelihood a
department's strategies would have
a measurable impact within the
evaluation period: The evaluability
potential was considered lower for
departments that focused on prevention and education (because
the window of observation was too
short) or that had diffused or shortterm target areas (too scattered an
effect in the former, not enough
time in the latter).
• Information systems status:
Change in the level of gun-related
crime was a critical component of
the impact evaluation. Thus, complete computerized records spanning several years, with accurate
ages of offenders and suspects and
specific offense codes for firearmsrelated crimes, increased the likelihood of successful intensive
evaluation.
• YFVI implementation status:
It was clear that some sites might
experience significant delays in
starting their YFVI program. Given
the short evaluation time period for
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each site, it was critical that the five
intensive sites have programs up
and running as soon as possible.

• Develop programs involving and assisting families in addressing youth
handgun problems.

• Nature of intervention: Some
sites implemented primarily policebased enforcement strategies, while
other sites emphasized prevention,
community policing, and other intervention approaches. Since the
evaluation was to focus on a broad
range of strategies, the intensive
sites should include both enforcement and prevention tactics, despite the greater difficulty of
evaluating the latter.

Furthermore, COPS encouraged jurisdictions to employ community policing
strategies to:

Based on these criteria, Baltimore,
Cleveland, Inglewood, Salinas, and
San Antonio were selected as the intensive sites. Birmingham, Bridgeport,
Milwaukee, Richmond, and Seattle
became the nonintensive sites. This
Research in Brief examines the experience of the intensive sites. 4

Strategies and tactics
The strategies and tactics proposed
by the YFVI departments focused on
three areas: streets, schools, and communities. Each department employed
geographic information systems and
crime analysis to support all three
areas. Exhibit 4 summarizes the main
program elements set up by each of
the five intensive sites.
COPS encouraged the police departments to:
• Work in conjunction with other city
agencies to promote education, prevention, and intervention programs
related to handguns and handgun
safety.
• Develop community-based programs
focused on youth handgun violence.

•••
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• Implement programs specifically
designed to decrease the number of
violent firearms crimes committed
by youths.
• Develop or enhance programs aimed
at reducing firearms-related gang
and drug offenses.
• Address the root causes of youth
firearms violence in specific geographic areas.
Traditional enforcement operations. As noted earlier, most sites used
street-based operations that featured
traditional enforcement tactics that the
departments perceived to be in compliance with the programmatic preferences
that COPS had communicated at the
outset of the initiative. Four of the five
intensive evaluation sites-Baltimore,
Inglewood, Salinas, and San Antonio-either set up new enforcement units
or expanded existing teams. All used
traditional surveillance and intelligencegathering techniques to identify targets
and to focus the teams' efforts. Actual
operations, for the most part, involved
location-specific, street-level activities.
With the exception of Salinas, which
adopted a citywide approach, YFVI
teams targeted specific neighborhoods
within their cities. During the life of the
initiative, the teams adjusted their targets based on their perceived effects on
the problem or the likelihood that firearms would be present at a particular
location at a particular point in time. To
make such judgments, the teams used a
combination of intelligence and analyses of their own past performance.
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Exhibit 4. Police department strategies and tactics
Site

Total Budget and
Configuration

Baltimore

$999,906
o

Cherry Hill:
9 officers

o

Park Heights:
15 officers

Street-Based
Activities
o

Juvenile Violent
Crime Fl ex Team: surve i\lance, intelligence
gathering, and targeted enforcement

o

Curfew Enforcement
Team : focused on
chronically truant
students

o

In Park Heights, 2 city
police officers worked
with middle and high
schools

o

Supported the Magnet
School for Law Enforcement, a criminal justice
curriculum for high
school students

o

Cleveland

$685, 342

o

27 offi cers,
2 sergeants

o -

Inglewood

$787,201
o

o

Salinas

Strengthened the
St reet Terrorist
Enforcement and
Prevention (STEP)
Task Force: 6 officers,
1 probation officer,
1 district attorney

$999,524
o

San Antonio

Strategy Against
Gang Environments
(SAGE) Gang
Enforcement Task
Force : 1 sergeant,
6 officers

Violence Suppressian Unit (VSU):
1 lieutenant,
2 sergeants,
16 officers

$999,963
o

Rotation : 9 officers
deployed nightly

o

o

o

None

SAGE program : civil
remedies against
gang members; task
force focused on
weapons violations

None

STEP: act with criminal sanctions against
street gangs and
a task force that
conducted street
enforcement
Probation officer targeted gang members
on probation

VSU: dedicated to
work full time on
suppressing youth
handgun violen ce

o

Crime tip hotline

o

Intensified efforts to
locate firearms and
track down their
ongins

o

Weapons Recovery
and Tracking Team

o

Street Crime Arrest
Team

o

Community resource centers (Kobans) in schools
provided a police presence
and liaison with community groups

o

Curfew enforcement
o fficers provtcled information, counseling, and lloustng to truant students and
fam ilies

o

RAPP House officers
coordinated cleanup
and yo uth activities

o

RAPP House used for neighborhood meetings

o

Rites-of-Passage Mentoring Program used police
officers, firefighters, and
comm unity leaders to teach
youths civic values, selfesteem, and conflict
mediation

Three officers implemented the Straight
Talk About Risk (STAR)
Program

Residential Area Policing Program (RAPP)
Houses in neighborhoods with high violence, staffed around
the clock for 90 days

o

Community-Based
Activities

School-Based
Activities

o

Gun and Weapons
Buy-Back Program

o

KID SAFE campaign taught
parents about the dangers
of handgun use and
possession

o

Media and poster campaign addressed youth firearm violence prevention

GIS*/Crime
Analysis
o

Department had
GIS capability prior
to YFVI

o

Department had
GIS capability prio r
to YFVI

o

Juvenile records
computerized for
YFVI

o

Internally developed
a GIS system (with
minimal YFVI fundin g)

None

None

o

An outside contractor implemented
ArcView/Arclnfo
system

None

None

o

Research into the
youth firearm vialence problem

o

Computer linkup
with trauma centers
throughout the city

* Geographic information systems.
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Perhaps the greatest variation among
departments was in the way the special
teams were organized and staffed. At
one extreme was the fully dedicated
unit where participating officers were
relieved of all regular patrol duties
except in emergencies (as in Salinas);
the other was the rotating assignment
of officers to the team on a temporary
overtime basis (as in San Antonio). 5
In Salinas, roughly 10 percent of the
sworn complement of 160 officers was
assigned to a Violence Suppression
Unit (VSU). They were led by a lieutenant, and two sergeants each managed a team of eight officers. The two
teams worked a 4-day week, with an
overlap day used for intelligence
sharing, cross-team debriefing,-and
planning. The VSU was housed in a
location separate from (though close
to) the main police station, and it operated independently. Team members
were relieved of all normal patrol functions, including response to calls for
service, and were given offsite training
in other cities. Team leaders planned
activities in conjunction with team
members and developed relatively
long-range plans to address the youth
firearms problem. The team established, monitored, and maintained an
intelligence system relating specifically to youths.
This approach led to a high level of
acceptance by the team members
and produced a highly focused effort.
Members rotated out of the unit only
for cause, became very knowledgeable
about the problems they addressed,
and came to know and be known by
youths in the city. This created a
degree of continuity that was highly
valued by team members.
The dedicated approach establishes an
elite unit within a department, risking
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a negative reaction from nonmembers.
This problem was greatly minimized
in Salinas because regular patrol
officers were offered overtime to backfill the patrol functions team members
no longer performed. Furthermore,
VSU leadership took pains to keep the
department informed about team activities, and cooperative activities involving the team and patrol units were
promoted whenever possible.
The San Antonio Weapons Recovery
and Tracking Team (WRAT) functioned
at the opposite pole. Union rules mandated the equitable rotation of ovet1ime
across officers, producing a situation in
which a different set of officers might
work on WRAT from day to day. This
model can be considered positive for
officer equity and opportunity, but it
limited the continuity of the team's activities. Five officers had limited and
sporadic exposure to the initiative's
undertakings, and planning and organization proceeded without much input
from them. YFVI activities in San
Antonio, therefore, tended to be more
reactive than in Salinas. This made
WRAT more like traditional enforcement and less like community- or
problem-oriented policing.
Beyond traditional enforcement.
Some departments supplemented traditional enforcement approaches with
other techniques, some of which were
enforcement oriented but which differed from the street-level approach
discussed above. Others were community or school based and embodied a
more preventive strategy.

The Inglewood Police Depa11ment
partnered with the probation department, which detailed a full-time officer
to work from police offices to scmtinize
gang members on probation. This pat1nership was extremely successful, and a
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significant number of violations were
detected. Inglewood also established the
Strategy Against Gang Environments
(SAGE) program, which filed contemptof-court sanctions against gang members
who violated civil injunctions against
assembly with other gang members.
This program involved close cooperation
between the police department and the
district attorney's office, with the latter
drafting and obtaining the civil injunction from the courts. It was difficult and
time consuming to set up, it garnered
little community support, and the eventual effects were uncertain. Inglewood
police officers also worked with community leaders to set up the Rites-ofPassage Mentoring Program to teach
youths civic values, self-esteem, and
conflict mediation.
In Cleveland, the initiative funded a
Residential Area Policing Program
(RAPP). In a small number of troubled,
violent neighborhoods, residences once
used as crack houses or for other illicit
purposes were convet1ed into police
substations. Community residents met
there to coordinate such activities as
neighborhood cleanups and to communicate community problems to the police, and local youths would drop in
to talk with officers. The houses were
staffed around the clock by Cleveland
officers for a period of 90 days. RAPP
Houses supported by YFVI funds were
set up consecutively in three different
neighborhoods. Community residents
responded favorably, and feedback was
positive. When the police department
proposed shutting down the RAPP
Houses, communities pressed successfully for their continued operation.
Baltimore also initiated school-based
activities, deploying a small number
of officers in schools on a more or less
dedicated basis. The officers emphasized educating students about risk,
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supported a specific criminal justice
curriculum, and served as counselors
and advisers as needed. Baltimore
extended these activities to the community by establishing community
resource centers and providing information and support to students and
families relating to curfew violations
and truancy.

Outputs and impacts
The YFVI assessment had a number of
dimensions, including examining the
effectiveness of the organization and
structure of the interventions-that is,
a qualitative review of the processes
and procedures that were employed.
Other dimensions involved measuring
results generated by the interventions
and their impact on the problem of
youth violence. To evaluate results,
data on the number of arrests made
and guns seized by YFVI teams were
considered output measures. To evaluate the possible impact on the problem, crime trends were analyzed in the
four intensive sites that emphasized
enforcement interventions; in Salinas,
a model of the relationship between
arrest activity and subsequent gun
crime levels was developed.
Output: Arrests made and guns
seized. Exhibit 5 presents the re-

ported number of arrests made and
guns seized in four intensive sites.
No numbers are reported for Cleveland
because the RAPP Houses did not
make arrests and seizures a goal,
and the RAPP neighborhoods were
too small to yield useful statistical
information.
The numbers vary from site to site despite relatively similar levels of Federal funding. However, although such
counts need to be reported, caution
must be exercised before these output
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Exhibit 5. Enforcement outputs: Arrests made and guns seized by YFVI units
Arrests•

Guns Seized

Baltimore

723

88

Clevelandb

N/A

N/A

Inglewood'

350

42

Salinas

713

180

2,142

254

City

San Antoniod

a. Includes all adult and juvenile arrests, not limited to gun-related arrests.
b. No data on enforcement outputs were provided because the focus of Cleveland's YFVI effort was on
stabilizing the RAPP House areas, rather than on seizing guns and making arrests.

c.

Includes only arrests and seizures made within the primary YFVI target area (Darby-Dixon).

d. Data include arrests and gun seizures in 1996 by the entire San Antonio Gang Crime/Intelligence Unit,
not just the eight YFVI-funded officers in that unit. Figures were taken from the local evaluation report.

measures are used to draw conclusions
about program effectiveness in any of
the sites. There are several reasons for
such caution.
First, the correspondence of arrests
and seizures to YFVI activities varies
by site. Some sites implemented effective tracking systems to capture YFVI
enforcement information, but others
did not. Salinas data, for example, accurately represent the VSU activities
because the counts were sufficiently
detailed that individual officers' activities could be identified from computerized department records. In other
sites, however, the information presented in exhibit 5 was not so easy to
interpret. The Inglewood numbers, for
instance, are probably an undercount
because they reflect activity only in
the primary target area (Darby-Dixon)
and do not capture YFVI team operations outside that area. San Antonio
numbers were probably an overstatement because they reported arrests
and seizures made by officers outside,
as well as inside, the YFVI unit.
Second, the scope of the data available
for review did not permit an assessment of the relative quality of the
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arrests made. This information would
be helpful. For example, an arrest of
a youthful repeat felon may have a
significantly greater effect on public
safety than a first-time arrest of an
adult offender for a minor infraction.
Third, large numbers of arrests and
seizures cannot necessarily be considered a sign of success, and few arrests
and seizures do not necessarily indicate failure. Geographically focused
enforcement efforts viewed as successful typically start out with high arrest
figures; then, the number of arrests decreases significantly. An intervention
that emphasizes deterrence through
frequent contact and involvement with
potential youthful offenders may produce fewer arrests than a traditional
enforcement approach. It might be
characterized by a greater number of
field interviews, for instance. Yet it
might be more effective in suppressing
violence than enforcement efforts that
emphasized arrests and seizures.
Fourth, some sites, such as San Antonio, used tactics specifically designed
and implemented to make arrests and
seize guns, while other sites deliberately implemented tactics designed
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for other purposes. In Cleveland, for
example, the RAPP House officers
focused on community interaction and
stabilizing the neighborhood instead
of on arrests and seizures.
Finally, a citywide enforcement
strategy-such as the approach implemented in San Antonio--was more
likely to yield larger numbers of arrests and seizures than a strategy that
focused on a small geographic area,
where the extended presence of YFVI
officers would undoubtedly reduce the
likelihood that persons would carry
guns on their person. Whether YFVI
officers responded to citizen calls for
service or if they were freed from that
responsibility and could focus exclusively on their proactive enforcement
efforts was another related factor.
Two sites-Salinas and San Antonio-experimented with different tactics to
determine which yielded the greatest
numbers of arrests and seizures. San Antonio, for example, employed five major
tactics: search warrants, saturation
patrol, directed patrol, knock and talk,
and bar checks. Salinas used eight major
tactics: profile enforcement, suppression
enforcement, probation searches, surveillance enforcement, search warrants,
arrest warrants, informant development,
and gang certification. A productivity
measure for each tactic was produced
based on the amount of time devoted to
the tactics and the number of guns
seized using each tactic. Executing
search wanants was by far the most productive tactic in both sites. In Salinas,
this tactic was 4.5 times more likely to
result in a gun seizure than any other
tactic. In San Antonio, the cost (in terms
of officer hours) per firearm seized via
search warrants was about 10 times less
than the cost per seizure of any other
tactic. Additional details on these figures
are available in the Salinas and San

in
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Antonio case studies (see "Supplementary YFVI Reports").
Impact: Gun crime trends. To as-

sess gun crime trends, incident-level
police data were obtained from the five
intensive sites from January 1993 until
the middle of 1997. These data provided access to facts about crimes and
arrests, including the time and place
of occurrence, the crime associated
with the incident, and the suspects
(if any). This information made it possible to map the incidents (identifying
which ones took place in target areas),
to derive or estimate the age of the
perpetrators (designating incidents involving juveniles), and to establish a
baseline for at least 2 years prior to the
commencement of YFVI (facilitating
comparisons over time). Standardized
procedures for classifying the data
were developed and applied to all
sites. (See "Crime Classification.")
In each of the five cities, reported gun
crimes declined after YFVI was imple-

mented. Reductions also took place
in all but one of the target areas (see
exhibit 6). Citywide decreases were
greatest in San Antonio (41 percent),
followed by Inglewood (23 percent),
Cleveland (15 percent), Salinas (11
percent), and Baltimore (2 percent).
Target-area reductions were greatest
in Darby-Dixon in Inglewood (49 percent), Cleveland RAPP House areas
(38 percent), and San Antonio (37
percent). In Baltimore, the Cherry Hill
target area experienced no change,
while Park Heights declined by 8 percent. In Salinas, where the initiative
was conducted citywide, the targetarea concept is irrelevant.
When these broad comparisons are
made, the target-area decreases in gun
crime were considerably greater than
citywide decreases in three of the target
areas (Cleveland RAPP Houses, DarbyDixon in Inglewood, and Park Heights
in Baltimore). Though San Antonio's
target areas showed a significant

Exhibit 6. Gun-related offenses in five sites
12-Month Period
Before YFVI Began

12-Month Period
After YFVI Began

Number of
Gun Crimes

Percent
Involving
Youths

Number of
Gun Crimes

Percent
Involving
Youths

Percent
Change

Baltimore
Cherry Hill
Park Heights

8,764
104
643

59
79
54

8,581
105
594

57
79
52

-2
0
-8

Cleveland
Three RAPP
Houses

3,149

66

2,672

47

-15

26

69

16

63

-38

Inglewood
Darby-Dixon

945
43

40
70

730
22

43
64

-23
-49

Salinas
Citywide

552

78

490

79

-11

2,895

57

1.716

55

-41

523

66

328

52

-37

San Antonio
Four target
areas

8
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decline (37 percent), the amount was
less than that which occuned in the
city at large, and Cherry Hill in Baltimore showed no change at all. 6
These compmisons are consistent with
the view that the interventions had an
effect in some of the sites, even though
they do not demonstrate causality. Compruing the percentages of gun crimes
involving youths before and after YFVI
provides further reason to be cautious.
Though encouraging declines in the percentage of youth involvement in violent
acts occuned in three of the five locations-from 70 percent to 64 percent in
Darby-Dixon in Inglewood, from 66 percent to 52 percent in the four San Antonio target areas, and from 69 percent to
63 percent around the Cleveland RAPP
Houses-these reductions are statistically significant only in San Antonio
(due to the small number of recorded offenses in the other locations). The reduction in Baltimore's Park Heights section
(from 54 percent to 52 percent) was significant, but small, and was no greater
than the citywide reduction. And finally,
both Chen")' Hill (Baltimore) and Salinas
experienced virtually no decline at all in
this measure.
Charting the trends in general gun
crime across the 5 years for which
there are data conveys additional
information. Exhibit 7 displays the
trends for four of the sites. 7
Prior to YFVI implementation, gun
crime patterns in the target areas were
similar to those in the sunounding city
or county. Levels of gun crime rose in
the city of Salinas and in Monterey
County until late summer 1996, after
which time they declined. Gun crime
increased in San Antonio city and
the target areas until the beginning
of 1996 and then fell sharply. Gun
crime in the other two sites gradually
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Exhibit 7. Gun offense trends in four cities, 1993-1997: Target areas compared with surrounding communities
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Note: The y-axis represents the weekly number of gun offenses across the 5-year period. These data were plotted by week and then smoothed to obtain the
trend lines in the displays. A logarithmic scale is used on they-axis for display convenience. This permits they-axis scale to be compressed so that target-area
and surrounding area trends can be visually represented in the same chart. Doing this does not alter the shape of the trend lines. Data obtained on gun crimes
in Baltimore do not include nonviolent gun offenses (e.g., carrying a concealed weapon) ,

decreased in both the target areas and
the cities at large.

imputation, it was much more difficult
to document it. 8

The similarity between the large area
and small area patterns suggests that
strong societal forces exerted a general
influence on gun crime trends and that
these worked similarly in most places.
Such forces were difficult to identify
conceptually, let alone measure and
monitor definitively. Consequently,
although it was easy to make this

Though the observed trends do not
demonstrate a causal connection between the initiative and the declines,
they offer some supporting evidence
for the notion that the initiative helped
produce the desired effects. If, for instance, target areas showed no greater
decline than surrounding areas or increased at a time when the general
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environment declined, then this would
constitute supporting evidence for the
interpretation that the initiative had
little or no effect. The most dramatic
change occurred in Inglewood, where
gun crimes in the Darby-Dixon target
area dipped sharply during the YFVI
period and then rebounded to 1994
levels after YFVI ended. Salinas also
experienced a proportionally greater
reduction than surrounding Monterey
County; again, this took place during
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the YFVI period. In both cities, this
evidence supports the notion of a
YFVI impact on gun crime.
In San Antonio and Baltimore, targetarea changes were either reductions
similar in scope to the city at large or
increases at a time when the city was
declining. In these two cities, the gun
crime trends did not support the idea
that YFVI had an effect on gun crime.
These interpretations rest on a number
of assumptions about the YFVI intervention: (1) that the underlying targetarea trends would have continued to
be like the surrounding area trends
during and after the YFVI timeframe;
(2) that simple counts of gun crimes
are a reasonable measure of the impact
of interventions of this kind; and (3)
that the primary effects of the intervention occurred during the measurement period, rather than later. It is
easy to see how these assumptions
might be invalid. For example, the
trends almost certainly do not capture
possible qualitative YFVI effects, such
as a reduced potential for younger
children to become involved in gun
crimes after the evaluation period
ended. Also, it is important to remember that the number of gun crimes
committed per week in all of these
cities was quite small; consequently,
a small change from week to week
produced a large effect on the chart.
Effects of arrests on gun crimes in
Salinas. To explore the effect of gunrelated arrests on the ensuing level of
gun-related crimes, the research team
analyzed 210 weeks of Salinas gun
crimes and gun-related arrests. Using
data from January 1993 through December 1996, researchers estimated
the effect of intensified police activity
directed toward gun-related crimes
committed by youths. The number of
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gun-related arrests (in part attributable
to YFVI) was considered a surrogate
for the level of police activity. The
variables used were weekly counts of
gun-related arrests and gun-related
crimes, as well as a violent crime
index for surrounding Monterey
County, excluding Salinas (countywide
gun crime data were unavailable, so
violent crime was substituted). 9
The results indicated that gun-related
crimes in Salinas were positively related to Monterey County's crime index (p = .028) and negatively related
to previous gun-related arrests in
Salinas (p = .051). Specifically, a
10-percentage-point increase in
Monterey County's crime index was
associated with one additional gun
crime in Salinas, and an increase of
five arrests in Salinas was followed by
one fewer gun crime in that town.
The pace at which the effect of past arrests unfolded is depicted in exhibit 8.
The graph indicates that 40 percent of
the effects of increased arrest activity
occurred within 1 week after an arrest,

•••

64 percent (the sum of 40 percent and
24 percent) occurred within 2 weeks,
and so on. Because more than 95 percent of the eventual effect occurred
within 6 weeks, then, for practical purposes, this can be considered the time
interval within which the eventual total effect of arrests on gun crime will
be made.
This model suggests with a high degree of statistical confidence that, in
Salinas at least, enforcement directed
proactively at firearms possession and
use has a measurable effect on subsequent firearms crime. This implies that
such activities likely had a quick and
salutary impact on crime. Furthermore, this relationship persisted over
a fairly long period of time (4 years in
this city). Nevertheless, the potential
magnitude of the impact is obviously
finite and is bound to diminish at some
point. That is, the marginal impact of
additional units of effort (say, one 8hour shift for one officer) will decline
as more shifts are added. In addition,
other cities may not have the same
experience as Salinas. In fact, during

Exhibit 8. Effects of gun-related arrests on gun-related crime in Salinas
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Crime Classification
rocedures were developed to
identify certain classes of crimes, such as
youth gun crimes. This required precise
definitions of a number of terms, as
follows:
Violent crime. The standard FBI definition of violent crime--crimes involving
homicide, rape, robbery, or aggravated
assault-was used in the evaluation.
Gun crime. For this evaluation, a gun
crime was defined as any crime in which
at least one of the associated charges
explicitly involved firearms. Charges that
explicitly involved firearms typically fell
into one of five categories: crimes against
persons (a robbery or aggravated assault
with a firearm, for example), discharging
a firearm, exhibiting a firearm, possession
of a firearm, and other firearm crimes
(crimes involving illegal sale or alteration
of a firearm, for example). Some gun
crimes involved a single gun-related
charge, while others involved multiple
gun-related charges (robbery with a firearm and illegal possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, for example).
Gun arrest. As with the definition used
for gun crimes, a gun arrest was defined
as one in which one of the arrest charges
explicitly involved firearms.
Youth gun crime. A youth gun crime
was defined as any crime in which at

the YFVI timeframe, most did not.
This may he due to the somewhat
unique nature of the Salinas situation-a relatively small, geographically distinct city surrounded by
agricultural land, in which 10 percent
of the police department's entire sworn
complement was dedicated to YFVI
to the exclusion of all other policing
responsibilities (except emergencies).

least one of the associated charges explicitly involved firearms and at least one
person involved in the crime was a youth.
Thus, the "age" classification of a particular crime was assumed to be the age
of the youngest arrestee or suspect involved in the crime. In the earlier interim
YFVI reports and in the case study reports
for the intensive sites, analyses were presented that used different definitions of
"youth," including persons aged 14 years
and under, 15 to 17 years, and 18 to 24
years. In this Research in Brief, "youths"
are defined as persons 24 years and under, because this definition corresponds
most closely to that used by the 10 police
departments.
Youth gun arrest. Similarly, a youth
gun arrest was any arrest in which at
least one of the arrest charges explicitly
involved firearms and the arrestee was a
youth. Again, a variety of definitions of
youth were used in earlier reports; in this
Brief, a "youth" is defined as a person
24 years old and younger.
YFVI target area crimes and arrests.
Mapping software, in conjunction with
the street addresses contained in the
crime and arrest files, was used to determine which crimes and arrests occurred
in the YFVI target areas, as well as in areas immediately adjacent to the target
areas.

To match this, a city such as San Antonio, for example, would have needed
to devote about 150 officers to YFVI
on a full-time basis. Such a level of
activity would have been impossible
to support through YFVI because
each city received roughly the same
amount of Federal support, regardless
of its size.
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Despite these caveats, the Salinas experience provides strong empirical affirmation of what many chiefs and officers
believe intuitively: A quick "knock
down" effect can be achieved by intensified enforcement. The diminishing
marginal utility of intensified enforcement should be investigated fmther.
Given the inevitable constraints on
police department revenues, it would be
useful, for instance, to calculate the
optimal periodicity and targeting of intensified enforcement-that is, where,
when, and how often it should be undertaken. Also, it is worth investigating
whether there is displacement to other
geographic areas or a resurgence to
earlier levels in the same area.

Residual effects of
the initiative
Programs such as YFVI raise a critical
question: What happens when the
Federal funding ends? Of particular
interest are the possible effects YFVI
programs have on the police departments themselves. That is, what is the
prognosis for the YFVI program to
have a long-term institutional impact
on the police hosting the intervention?
Modification in orientation. Police
officers and supervisors in most YFVI
sites commented on their department's
use of overtime to deal with crime more
effectively. Relieving YFVI officers
of normal calls-for-service response
requirements-getting them "off the
radio"-was an important objective in
some cities. The general idea of many
of these programs was to pay overtime
to the YFVI officers (or the replacements who backfilled their positions)
while they were in the YFVI program.
The police agency benefited because it
increased police presence in the targeted areas, and this presence was not
created at the expense of 911 or other
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call-taking systems. In this instance,
overtime provided organizational flexibility, which was devoted to youth and
firearms problems.
Many police officials said unions and
other officers were much more accepting of the program when overtime
money was made available to a wider
number of police officers through the
backfill process. To some extent, the
potentially negative effects of the YFVI
officers' "elite" status were overcome
by paying other officers to work in the
positions vacated by the YFVI team.
The logic offered here is straightforward: Federal funding can be a force
multiplier. More officer hours can be
spent on the street without increasing
the number of officers in the department. However, there is an important
complication. Implicitly, the Federal
Government and the departments themselves say such efforts as YFVI would
not be feasible--even if desirable and
valuable-if additional resources were
not provided through Federal support.
Departmental capacity is locally perceived as fully engaged in the operations being conducted prior to the
provision of Federal funds.
This presumption seems to inhibit the
likelihood of program institutionalization and may undermine several problemoriented and community-oriented
policing premises. For example, such a
presumption suggests that community
policing and problem solving are luxuries, affordable only after the basic
functions of policing are accomplished.
This implies that a combination of
budgetary constraints and political
pressures to deal with calls for service
impedes a department's ability to
modify its major response systems.
Rather, a department would continue
using city budgets to finance regular
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patrols and employ supplementary State
and Federal dollars for special programs. Absent the latter, such initiatives
as YFVI might, therefore, be impossible
to launch. Such an interpretation seems
to provide additional support, both normative and economic, for continuing
traditional patrol responses.
This arrangement also implies that the
cost of providing problem-solving services becomes roughly 1.5 times that
normally incurred by the police (because the services are paid through
overtime). In this sense, the cost of police services in a jurisdiction receiving
Federal funding will go up, in both a
relative and an absolute sense, even
though the increases are "shared"
by the Federal taxpayer. If the YFVI
program is established to increase
problem-solving applications by police
departments, the model of creating
overtime to do so may be counterproductive to the program's long-range
goals.
Consequently, the effects of such programs as YFVI may be restricted to a
short-term subsidy of traditional police
patrol responses, unless a department
either adjusts its strategic and tactical
responses (learns from the initiative) or
identifies other funding sources to fill
the gap when Federal funding ends.
This view has negative implications
for continuing and institutionalizing a
program-a goal of YFVI and of most
Federal support programs (the Byrne
Formula Grant Program and the Local
Law Enforcement Block Grant Program, for example). Without sustained
resources from a source outside the
regular city budget, it seems unlikely
that such institutionalization will occur
in many places, at least not on the
scale of the funded program.
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Noteworthy approaches. For the

most part, the police tactics employed in
YFVI were largely adapted from the
patrol model. These included heavily
patrolling selected areas of the city,
making traffic stops, and conducting
field interrogations. In this sense,
despite the reservations mentioned
above, most sites implemented a significant enforcement effort aimed at youth
firearms violence. In addition, at least
three sites (Cleveland, Inglewood, and
Salinas) undertook strategic innovation
as a direct consequence of YFVI.
The Cleveland RAPP Houses created
a new approach to dealing with distressed communities, an approach that
involved more than just a neighborhood substation. The RAPP Houses
differ from substations because a
deliberate outreach effort was undertaken to draw area youths into direct
contact with police officers in a relaxed setting. It is extremely difficult
to evaluate the effect of this kind of
program because the behavioral
change it might induce is specific to
individuals and long term. Followup
with particular individuals might be
necessary to assess how the RAPP
House approach affected them. However, this was beyond the scope of the
evaluation and the timeframe of the
initiative. The researchers ascertained
that community reaction was so positive that residents lobbied for continuing the first RAPP House when it was
scheduled to close. In addition, participating officers were very supportive
and uniformly appeared to favor the
strategy. It was also possible to affirm
that the program would continue at
some level when the initiative ended,
suggesting the approach had been
institutionalized within the command
structure of the police department and
city government.
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The Inglewood initiative was notable
for its combination of enforcement,
collaboration with other criminal
justice agencies (probation and the
district attorney), and creation of community programs (Rites-of-Passage).
The police-probation collaboration
was particularly effective. Police and
probation officials alike credited the
funding of a deputy probation officer
and housing that officer in the police
department as contributing significantly to YFVI's effectiveness.
Whether this arrangement could be
continued was not clear at the time
the evaluation ended, but doing so
would be highly productive.
The Salinas intervention was unique
because it created a dedicated team of
officers working full time on YFVI, with
no responsibilities for normal patrol or
routine call response. (Emergency responses were still undertaken.) It was
also unique for the magnitude of the
effmt relative to the total size of the
force. Salinas has roughly 160 sworn
positions. The VSU had 1 lieutenant,
2 full-time sergeants, and 16 full-time
officers-more than 10 percent of the
depa1tment's entire force. Finally, its
focus was strategically appropriate for a
YFVI response: It targeted youths in a
continuous and deliberate manner.

Summary
The evidence from Inglewood and
Salinas supports the view that the
YFVI intervention coincided with a
significant drop in the level of gun
crime in both places. In Inglewood,
not only did gun crimes drop dramatically during the YFVI implementation period, but after the initiative
concluded, gun crimes returned to
their preinitiative levels. Reductions
also took place in Salinas and continued through the end of the observa-
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tion period. One difference between
the two sites is that although Federal
funding ended in Salinas at about the
same time as in Inglewood, the Salinas Police Department continued the
VSU program at essentially the same
level. Inglewood, on the other hand,
terminated its police-probation collaboration due to lack of funds. The
implication is that intervention most
likely reduced gun crime in both
places. The comparison of target-area
experience with citywide trends supports this interpretation.
In the other intensive sites, YFVI interventions did not appear to produce
these results. The reasons for this finding are not completely clear, although
the importance of Salinas' dedicated
and focused Violence Suppression
Unit and Inglewood's highly successful
partnership between the police department and the probation office should
not be underestimated. 10
In conclusion, the results of the YFVI
effmt seemed to depend on how departments conceived the initiative and
the consistency of their focus throughout its life. Given the problems experienced by some departments with
conceptualization and implementation,
variability in outcomes was to be expected. These observations suggest
the Federal Government could play a
stronger role in ensuring that participating departments adhere to the strategic goals and objectives in future
initiatives of this kind. Also, funding
agencies should adopt a timetable that
more closely matches the exigencies of
the world in which most departments
operate. In particular, it is desirable
for the Federal agency to ensure that
local recipients do not view an initiative as simply a transfer of Federal
funds to another level of government.
Simultaneously, care must be taken
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not to impose Federal solutions on
local problems; that is, the strategies
and tactics that are employed must be
locally developed.

Notes
l. The Boston Gun Project was a problemsolving effort to reduce gang activity and interrupt the self-sustaining cycle of fear and
weapons acquisition and use. The methods
included (1) a use-reduction strategy that employed both traditional and new technological
gun tracing to identify and interrupt gun flow to
youths and (2) a deterrence strategy that communicated to youths the severe criminal consequences they would face if they were caught
with firearms in their possession.
2. The St. Louis "Knock and Talk" program involved a collaboration between the police and
community to target firearms possession by
youths. Police and probation officers made informal visits to the homes of youths suspected
of possessing guns. The problem was discussed
with parents and may have included a request
to permit a search for guns. Respondents were
immunized from prosecution based on the information they gave, though not from prosecution based on uncovered evidence (if a gun
used in a crime was found, for example).
3. The process evaluations are reported in
detail in the 10 case studies and the cross-site
report. See "Supplementary YFVI Reports."
4. The 10 sites were split into 2 equal groups
for budgetary reasons. No comparative ranking
of site interventions or results was implied by
the actual selection. Case studies for all 10
sites were produced by the evaluation and can
be located through the National Criminal Justice Research Service. See "Supplementary
YFVI Reports."
5. Additional details on these figures are
available in the Salinas and San Antonio case
studies. See "Supplementary YFVI Reports."
6. The declines that occurred were all statistically significant beyond the .05 level with the
exception of the Cleveland RAPP Houses,
where the low number of gun crimes leads to

ap

=.14.

7. Cleveland is excluded because the level of
gun crime in the RAPP House areas was too
small for charts to be useful. In the other sites,
target-area data are compared to citywide data,
except in the case of Salinas, where the county
was substituted because the intervention was
citywide. Also, violent crime in general was
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